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Abstract:  
 
In the ten years that have passed since September 11, 2001, media discourses 
regarding  Muslims have changed superficially while essentializing stereotypes 
have been reinforced for the general public. This is true of many forms of media, 
but this paper focuses on popular television entertainment, and the way in which 
this has framed the Muslim woman. Media have had a longstanding fascination 
with the Muslim woman but this appears to have grown during the war in 
Afghanistan. Despite greater attention to this subject, the overarching discourses 
do not seem to be more complex than they were during previous events, such as 
the 1979 Revolution in Iran. Indeed, portrayals of Muslim women on television 
are arguably more regressive now than on September 10, 2001. Admittedly, at 
that time, it would probably have been unthinkable to imagine a series such as 
Little Mosque on the Prairie, and this show does constitute a significant source of 
change. However, when looking at depictions of female Muslim characters on 
shows such as Little Mosque and other popular network shows from the last ten 
years, such as  24, it is clear that television after 9/11 has not evolved in its 
depiction of the Muslim woman.  Drawing upon existing literature regarding 
historical depictions, and utilizing a textual analysis of contemporary shows such 
as 24, Little Mosque on the Prairie and Lost, this paper interrogates the role of 
entertainment media in advancing pluralist discourses, and investigates the 
limitations and possibilities of historical and contemporary depictions of Muslim 
women in such media. 
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Résumé: 
 
Dans les dix ans qui ont passé depuis le 11 septembre 2001, les discours 
médiatiques concernant les musulmans ont changé de façons superficielles 
pendant que l’essentialisation des stéréotypes a été renforcée au public général. 
Ceci est vrai pour plusieurs formes de médias. Mais cet article se concentre sur la 
télévision de divertissement populaire et de la façon dont celle-ci a représenté la 
femme musulmane. Les médias ont une fascination de longue date avec la femme 
musulmane, mais ceci semble avoir augmenté pendant la guerre en Afghanistan. 
Au mépris de l’attention grandissante à ce sujet, le discours global ne semble pas 
être plus complexe que ceux d’événements précédents, tels que la révolution de 
1979 en Iran. À vrai dire, les représentations des femmes musulmanes à la 
télévision sont sans doute plus régressives maintenant que le 10 septembre 2001. 
Certes, à ce moment-là, il aurait été probablement inconcevable d’imaginer une 
série telle que  La petite mosquée dans la prairie  (version française de Little 
Mosque on the Prairie),  et cette émission constitue une source signifiante de 
changement. Cependant, quand nous regardons les représentations de personnages 
musulmanes féminines sur des émissions telles que La petite mosquée ainsi que 
d’autres émissions populaires des derniers dix ans, telles que l’émission 24, nous 
constatons que la télévision après le 11 septembre n’a pas évolué dans ces 
représentations de la femme musulmane. En se basant sur la littérature existante 
en ce qui concerne la représentation historique et en utilisant une analyse textuelle 
d’émission contemporaine telle que 24, La petite mosquée dans la prairie  et 
Perdu (version française de Lost) cet article vérifie les limites ainsi que les 
possibilités des représentations historiques et contemporaines de la femme 
musulmane dans ces médias.  
 
Mots-clés:  Islam; Femme Musulmane; Représentation Médiatique;  Stéréotype; 
Télévision 
 
 
 
 
And So It Begins: Images of Muslim Women Over Time 
 
As Karim H. Karim notes, “[m]isuse of the terms related to Islam is endemic in the transnational 
media” (2000: 10), and this statement rings especially true when examining depictions of 
Muslim women in the media. Such consistent misuse and negative imagery are embedded in 
longstanding Orientalist discourses, as outlined by Edward Said (1978) in his analysis of 
artwork, travellers’ diaries, and historical documents compiled by those who travelled through 
Muslim societies over centuries. Said suggests that the tendency to view the Muslim as Other is 
longstanding, stretching back as far as the Middle Ages. While many of the Orientalist 
imaginaries concern Muslim men as terrorists, sexists and barbarians, images of Muslim women 
as conspirators, victims or sexually available underpin these portrayals, even when they are 
suggested more by their absence than by their presence. For instance, with regard to the notion of 
the Muslim woman as perpetually oppressed, Karim comments on a 1990 article by the eminent Through the Looking Glass: Muslim Women on Television— 
An Analysis of 24, Lost, and Little Mosque on the Prairie 
35 
Orientalist scholar Bernard Lewis, who suggests that the Muslim man’s undeniable rage can be 
explained, at least partly, by the newly found freedom of women and children, which challenges 
his masculinity and authority: “he had medieval sensibilities and hatreds: whereas his feelings of 
resentment at being defeated and colonized may be understandable, his perceived rage at the 
supposed emancipation of his women and children was not” (2000: 141). These same 
imaginaries can be found in media images today. 
Over the years, Muslim women have constituted a source of fascination in the media, 
representing both victimization and incomprehensible difference. This is particularly true in 
times of conflict, such as the Iranian Islamic Revolution (e.g.,  Sreberny-Mohammadi & 
Mohammadi, 1994), the Gulf War of 1991, and the ongoing “war on terror”. The latter was often 
described by journalists as a way to liberate Afghan women oppressed by Taliban rule (e.g., 
Wente, 2001; Why the Taliban had to be fought, 2001). Muslim men, of course, also drew their 
share of media attention, but the figure of the Muslim woman became intensely fetishized in the 
period following September 11, 2001 (9/11), serving as a symbolic justification for the ongoing 
conflict in Afghanistan. The Muslim woman who veils or covers herself became particularly 
noteworthy. As Karim comments, the “Northern mass media have the tendency to declare 
manifestations of Muslim belief such as the call for decency in films, wearing the hijab, or even 
performing the Muslim prayer as certain signs of ‘Islamic fundamentalism’” (2000: 182). While 
the glare of the media may be most intense in the arena of news, dramatic and comedic programs 
also began to incorporate images of the Muslim woman after 9/11. Although they did this in 
different ways, the overall results tend towards a simplistic rendering of what it means to be 
Muslim, and of the Muslim woman as an inescapably exotic figure. The events of 9/11 are 
undeniably shocking and tragic. However, in the aftermath, opportunities for reflection and 
commemoration are especially valuable. The period after 9/11  provided an opportunity to 
educate non-Muslims by expanding the range of discourses available about Muslims and Muslim 
women: instead, the most significant outcome is a hardening of the stereotypes and 
misperceptions that have been promoted so often in the media. 
As a number of scholars have noted (Jiwani, 2009; Karim, 1997; 2000; Razack, 2004), 
mediated depictions of Muslim women tend to display certain consistencies, many of which fit 
into the categories identified by Fleras and Kunz in their description of media images of 
minorities: “invisible”, “problem people”, “stereotype”, and “adornment” (2001: ix). While the 
specific stereotypes may differ on points of detail, they have a common historical lineage. In the 
Oriental travelogues of the past, or in works of art (e.g., Kabbani, 1986; Said, 1978), Muslim 
women were depicted in limited ways, sometimes as the victims of repression at the hands of 
Muslim men. As Frantz Fanon (1959) has pointed out, abuses visited upon Muslim women by 
colonizing forces, including the forcible removal of veils, are rarely seen as fitting into this 
typology of victimization. Instead, Western men, with the West standing in at that time as a 
broad term representing white, developed (or civilized, in Orientalist terminology) nations, are 
usually the rescuers when they enter these portrayals. Repression may take many forms, ranging 
from the disempowerment associated with having to wear highly concealing clothing, to 
suggestions of abuse at the hands of the violent Muslim man. Another category of depiction was 
the sexualized, exoticized Muslim woman. While some observers might have seen harems and 
polygamy as the signs of women suffering from oppression, others saw these as indicative of the 
sexual availability of the Muslim woman (e.g.,  Kabbani, 1986). In this case, the lustful, 
hypersexualized Muslim man would have a partner who possessed all the same qualities.  Faiza Hirji  36 
Although these categories may seem far removed from one another, they are connected 
by their investment in the belief that the Muslim woman is different in profound ways from the 
Western woman. In all of the portrayals that existed then, and that exist now, there appears to be 
an undercurrent that suggests that Muslim women are essentially different from a Western-
defined norm, ignoring the reality that the “Western legacy of androcentrism and misogyny, 
though differing in its specificities, is nevertheless, generally speaking, no better than that of 
other cultures, including the Islamic” (Ahmed, 1982: 128). In the Orientalist literature of the 
past, however, the suggestion prevails not only of difference, but of the Muslim woman’s 
inferiority.  
As the following analysis demonstrates, these tropes continue to manifest themselves in 
contemporary media. As the war in Afghanistan was launched, and then persisted, turning into a 
conflict with no apparent end and with heavy casualties, the liberation of Afghan Muslim women 
became one of the markers of the war’s success. In the fall of 2001, writers for papers as varied 
as The Guardian (e.g., Toynbee, 2002), The New York Times (Rohde, 2001; Waldman, 2001), 
and The Globe and Mail (Gee, 2001; Lives of Afghan women, 2001; Wente, 2001) spoke of the 
war as a worthwhile cause if only Afghan women could remove their burqas. Ready or not, 
Afghan Muslim women entered the global stage—to a point. They did not always have an 
opportunity to speak for themselves, but silent, still images of them, fully clad in blue burqas, 
were interpreted by Western media as signs that they needed rescue (Jiwani, 2009).  
As news media engaged in intensive coverage of Afghan women, other forms of media 
began to enter the fray, but in different ways. In the years since 9/11, Muslim women, not just 
Afghan women, have been intensely scrutinized by various forms of media, otherwise known as 
“systems of persuasion” (Fleras & Kunz, 2001: 50). Assumptions of gender inequality within 
Islam have been cited to explain why symbols of Islam are problematic or even prohibited in 
some countries. Battles over Sharia law erupted in Ontario and Quebec from 2003-2005, even 
though there was no proposal to implement any kind of Islamic tribunal in Quebec. In a pre-
emptive gesture, the Quebec National Assembly passed a motion prohibiting Sharia, in part due 
to a belief that any form of Islamic law was inherently sexist. In the years following 9/11, both 
Ontario and Quebec have seen controversies over the wearing of hijab in certain places, such as 
the classroom, soccer field and the workplace. More recently, in 2010, France moved to ban the 
wearing of burqas in public, arguing that the burqa symbolized oppression and inequality. 
Although, unlike the news media, it did not often wade into these waters, television 
entertainment managed to address the Muslim woman in its own way.  
 
Here’s Looking at You: The Faces of Television 
 
The notion that North American television is insufficiently diverse is hardly new. Critics such as 
Fleras and Kunz (2001) and Jiwani (1993) have suggested that television, which is dominated by 
white, middle-class characters, does not reflect the demographic reality of most urban centres in 
North America. As in the news media (e.g., Henry & Tator, 2002), representations of race and 
religion may be problematic in a number of respects, ranging from issues of underrepresentation 
to stereotyping and bias. As Henry and Tator note, this is significant because “media are one of 
the most powerful institutions in a democratic society because they help transmit its central 
cultural images, ideas, and symbols, as well as a nation’s narratives and myths” (2002: 4).  
The depiction of Muslim women suffers from some of the same problems noted above, 
although interestingly, underrepresentation appears, at least from 2001 onwards, to become less Through the Looking Glass: Muslim Women on Television— 
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of an issue. Indeed, the sudden appearance of Muslim women on television merits an 
examination in itself, especially in the context of Fleras and Kunz’s assertion that “television 
representations of minority women and men operate primarily within the boundaries of a 
racialized discourse about the unmarked superiority of whiteness as natural and normal” (2001: 
89). Some might suggest, of course, that television dramas and comedies are intended for 
entertainment only, and hence do not merit serious examination. This paper, however, 
demonstrates a special interest in television programming, given the enormous power of 
television.  
Despite the increased importance of online content, hit shows such as Lost  and  24 
continued to attract viewers in the period following 9/11  and to generate considerable 
conversation. Indeed, in the case of 24, there have been suggestions that the show’s content 
influenced real life. When Barack Obama competed for the opportunity to become the 
Democratic presidential candidate, 24’s fans and even one cast member argued that the 
American public was more ready for a black president than it would otherwise have been, given 
that the show had already prepared viewers by depicting such a scenario (Bayard, 2008). If these 
comments seem improbable, consider the astonishment of West Point instructors and legal 
experts who found that students and even a U.S. Supreme Court Justice cited scenes from 24 
when explaining why torture was acceptable  (Buncombe, 2007; Macklin, 2008). It is no 
exaggeration, perhaps, when Fleras and Kunz state that “[m]edia construct realities by 
‘naturalizing’ our perception of the world as normal rather than conventional and constructed, 
while stereotyping other world views as invisible or problematic” (2001: 53). 
It has been argued that media depictions of minority groups can affect audiences 
(Greenberg, Mastro & Brand, 2002). In this case, the effect would be especially profound if the 
fictional entertainment ties into a larger discourse around the categorization of Muslim women, 
helping to validate pre-existing stereotypes. As Henry and Tator argue, biased representations in 
media discourse “are difficult to overturn. They provide a deep reservoir of familiar myths, 
unexamined assumptions, and reassuring stereotypes” (2002: 16). On a related note, Fleras and 
Kunz point out that television has been particularly influential when exposing viewers to images 
and ideas that might otherwise be outside of their everyday reality: “Television’s greatest impact 
was on those whose physical location in society had restricted their social experiences” (2001: 
93).  
While the average viewer may be able to distinguish between fact and fiction, this 
becomes increasingly difficult if a variety of media come together to create a consistent picture. 
Henry and Tator cite media analysts who suggest “that people require discipline and active, self-
critical awareness in order to counteract their schematic tendencies and stereotypic thinking. 
Most people—audience members—have neither the motivation nor the skills to challenge 
aspects of their own deeply engrained thought processes” (2002: 29). This is difficult not only 
for non-Muslims who have a limited base of knowledge to draw upon and may instead look to 
the media for information about a group of people; misrepresentations can also negatively affect 
Muslim viewers who have to see themselves depicted as the enemy of the state. And indeed, in 
the programs that I analyze here, there are suggestions—though admittedly inconsistent—that 
the Muslim woman is an enemy, or at the very least, inherently problematic through her insistent 
difference from the norm.  
Some of these programs may utilize stereotypical imagery frequently and rather openly, 
especially in the case of programs that are heavily invested in narratives of terror and enemy 
infiltration, as with the dramatic series 24. Others, however, may be more well-intentioned, as in Faiza Hirji  38 
the case of the light-hearted comedic series Little Mosque on the Prairie and yet even Little 
Mosque, touted as an enlightening and successful comedy that can challenge dominant 
discourses (Mahtani, 2008), does very little to change essentializing images of Muslim women. 
Other shows, such as Lost, depict images that are presumably intended to be neutral, yet still 
convey difference and victimhood. Stereotypical portrayals of Muslim women often do fall into 
paradigms of victimhood and oppression, usually at the hands of Muslim men, with this 
oppression expressed in a host of ways, ranging from compulsion to veil, to inability to assert 
oneself, to fear of violence. However, as Orientalist travelogues of the past demonstrated, there 
are also recurring depictions of Muslim women as exotic, sexualized objects, while more 
contemporary portrayals address the notion of the Muslim woman herself as a threat, whether as 
a terrorist or in some other sense that demonstrates an inevitable link between Islam and 
violence. These three images, moreover, may not be mutually exclusive, and are often woven 
together by a clear reminder of the Muslim woman’s essential difference from the mainstream or 
the norm.  
 
Analysis 
 
This paper provides an analysis of Muslim female characters on 24, Lost, and Little Mosque on 
the Prairie, drawing upon notions of gender and performativity, and suggesting that the Muslim 
femininity performed on these shows is linked in significant ways to the perceptions of Muslim 
women detailed in Orientalist writings, as discussed in the work of Leila Ahmed (1982; 1999), 
Rana Kabbani (1986), Karim H. Karim (2001), and Edward Said (1978). On the one hand, these 
shows take up the challenge of portraying minorities referred to by Fleras and Kunz (2001), who 
note that in 1999, none of the major U.S. networks featured minority main characters. While 
there are some departures from conventional stereotypes, and indeed, moments of considerable 
triumph in the portrayal of Muslim women on television, I argue that these moments remain far 
more limited than they should be, given the increased number of Muslim characters to be found 
on contemporary television, and given the significant opportunities to provide alternative 
discourses after 9/11. Moreover, while there are departures from stereotypes in some of these 
examples, they are not complete departures from an assumed Muslim norm, which means that 
some Muslim women continue to be underrepresented on North American television. 
Having said that, if it is true that some minorities find affirmation in seeing themselves 
reflected in the mass media, there were undoubtedly more opportunities for Muslim women to 
see some version of themselves over the last 10 years. 24, Lost and Little Mosque on the Prairie 
are selected here as texts for analysis given their popularity as well as their consistent inclusion 
of Muslim women in their storylines. Admittedly, the three shows are not equivalent: Little 
Mosque  is a Canadian comedy, while the other two are American dramas. Little Mosque’s 
audience is smaller and the show, which is still ongoing, has been on the air for fewer years than 
24 and Lost, neither of which is currently on the air. Even the serial dramas 24 and Lost have 
notable differences: 24 was an action-packed drama about terrorism, while Lost had elements of 
fantasy and the supernatural. All three shows, however, give space to Muslim characters and 
indicate their awareness of anti-Islam sentiment after 9/11.  
At the same time, “the appearance of diversity is one thing, the implementation of 
meaningful diversity is another” (Fleras & Kunz, 2001: 99). In order to determine whether or not 
these shows help implement such diversity in a post-9/11 environment, I examined each of these 
series in their totality, seeking to ascertain whether or not Orientalist stereotypes of Muslim Through the Looking Glass: Muslim Women on Television— 
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women were present, or whether new discourses could be unearthed. In the case of Lost, this 
involved the study of one character only, but for the other two shows, multiple characters were 
analyzed. In particular, if there is one show whose depiction of Muslims attracted considerable 
attention over an extended period of time, it is the now-defunct 24, which wrapped up in 2010 
after eight action-packed seasons in which the hero, American counterterrorist agent Jack Bauer, 
battled shadowy groups intent on destroying the United States. From season to season, the 
villains have changed, ranging from Russians to Chinese to corrupt American politicians and 
arms manufacturers. One popular trope, however, has been that of sinister Muslim antagonists, 
as well as characters whose religion is not defined but whose ethnicity appears to be Middle 
Eastern or South Asian, making it possible to associate them with Islam.  
Interestingly, when Muslim women make their first appearance on 24, it could be argued 
that they subvert conventional images of oppression, victimization and voicelessness. At the 
same time, the women who are portrayed are far from positive. In Season 2, when an Islamist 
terrorist cell has taken up residence in Los Angeles, the woman who provides valuable assistance 
to Bauer’s team is not a Muslim, but a white Californian, Kate, who is knowledgeable about 
Arabic and Middle Eastern customs due to a sojourn in Saudi Arabia. She offers to infiltrate a 
mosque, wearing hijab, in order to obtain intelligence for Bauer’s team. The actual Muslim 
women in the mosque are never important or depicted as individual personalities; if they are 
considered at all, they can be seen as silent and voiceless, or more darkly, as worshippers in a 
place that represents a danger to the state. There is a plot twist in that Kate’s sister Marie, who 
appears to be a flighty young heiress, is one of the most dangerous characters in the show—
while Kate initially suspects Marie’s Middle Eastern fiancé Reza of being a terrorist, it is 
revealed that Marie is the real danger, while Reza is completely innocent.  
Lest one think that this removes the Muslim threat, Marie makes clear her religious 
motivation. An apparent convert to Islam—although the circumstances of her conversion remain 
obscure—Marie precedes one act of terrorism with the phrase “Alhamdulillah [all praise is due 
to Allah]”. Once she is unmasked as a Muslim, Marie is depicted as a ruthless murderer, possibly 
a sociopath, who appears incapable of feeling any affection towards others and who cannot 
articulate a comprehensible reason  for her actions. She provides a rendering of Islamic 
femininity that takes the Orientalist stereotypes to their most extreme conclusion: she is 
deceptive, murderous, illogical, completely lacking in compassion, and willing to employ her 
sexuality to attain the results she seeks. Moreover, although she cannot explain her motivation, 
she shows unquestioning loyalty to the male Muslim terrorist who is the chief antagonist in this 
storyline. Hence, while she is no victim, she has no real importance in herself: she is merely a 
tool employed by the dangerous Muslim man. 
Similarly, in Season 4, the character of Dina is another ruthless killer, dedicated to her 
cause, willing to make almost any sacrifice. Again, as with Marie, it is clear that Dina and her 
husband are loyal to a dangerous Islamist group, but there is no real cause that is articulated and 
explained. Being Middle Eastern or Muslim seems to be explanation enough for the various 
murders committed by Dina and her family members. Unlike Marie, Dina does redeem herself to 
a certain extent—when her son is placed in danger, Dina agrees to help Jack Bauer and the 
Counterterrorist Unit, but after acting as a double agent, she meets an untimely end. Here, the 
fanatical Muslim woman is duplicitous and dangerous, but not quite dangerous enough. She ends 
up, like the Muslim women depicted in classical Orientalist imaginaries, silenced completely, her 
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24’s consistent depiction of Muslims as terrorists has attracted considerable attention, not 
least from the Council on American Islamic Relations (Jasser, 2007). Such criticisms did result 
in Fox airing a 2005 disclaimer about the show’s content, which suggested that a seemingly 
ordinary Muslim family could be part of a terrorist sleeper cell. Additionally, the show has also 
tacked on the occasional Muslim character who is trustworthy, in an apparent attempt to balance 
the scales. Of these attempts, one of the most promising involved the inclusion of a Muslim 
counterterrorist agent, Nadia Yassir, in an entire season of 24.  
Unlike some of the other Muslim women on this show, Nadia is an honest, dedicated 
patriot. However, her character undergoes minimal development and actually becomes less 
appealing over time, as she moves from ultra-competent to uncertain, confused and even 
cowardly. Facing danger, Nadia hesitates to put herself in the line of fire, and is saved by a brave 
white man, who is killed in her defence. Her character becomes increasingly peripheral to the 
plot, disappearing entirely from the series after one season. This places her in stark contrast to 
some of the show’s white female characters, such as Kim, Kate, Audrey, Renee and Chloe. There 
are certainly problematic elements in terms of the series’ treatment of these women but it must 
be said that their characters demonstrate growth over time. In contrast, Nadia simply fades away, 
as does the opportunity to expand the spectrum of representation in a meaningful way.  
Although their characters are different, Dalia and Kayla Hassan, from the final season of 
24, also fade into the background in some respects. Dalia is presented as someone who was once 
an important advisor to her husband, Omar Hassan, President of the fictional Islamic Republic of 
Kamistan, but it is only in the final episodes that she is depicted positively. Initially, she is shown 
mainly as a cold wife jealous of Hassan’s infidelity with an attractive, independent Western 
woman, and has to be calmed down several times by Omar and by the all-American hero Jack 
Bauer when she appears shrill and angry over their daughter Kayla’s kidnapping. Jack silences 
her with a stern reminder that it is her family that has introduced a threat into his country, which 
he is now working to address as best as he can. Unlike Nadia, Dalia, who covers her hair and is 
unimpressed by American power, is presented as someone who is clearly different from the 
white American female norm shown on 24. Later, Dalia assumes her husband’s presidential 
mantle, but only by virtue of her family’s power and her assassinated husband’s legacy.  
While Dalia takes on this obligation with dignity and apparent integrity, there is no 
mistaking the fact that her ascension to power is facilitated by the American President, Alison 
Taylor, who then uses Dalia in order to advance her own interests. Likewise, Kayla, Dalia and 
Omar’s daughter, is rarely an active participant in most proceedings, but is primarily Omar’s 
devoted, dutiful daughter. In an interesting departure from her demure public image but a rather 
clichéd alignment with notions of the sensual Muslim woman, she does defy her parents’ wishes 
by engaging in a secret affair with her father’s head of security, Tarin. Tarin later turns out to be 
a terrorist who almost succeeds in killing Kayla. Her rescue is not due to her own ingenuity, but 
to the protection provided by the Counterterrorist Unit, which is almost decimated when Kayla 
unwittingly drives a rigged car into its headquarters. While Kayla is no villain, she is involved 
with a Muslim extremist and fails to exercise her own agency. 
Even when Kayla discovers that Alison Taylor has been lying to Dalia, mother and 
daughter remain powerless. Only a crisis of conscience on Taylor’s part offers a positive 
resolution. After eight years of depicting a variety of Muslim characters, however, 24 does offer 
some of its most positive portrayals in its final season, with the Hassan family. Although Dalia is 
unsympathetic early on, she later emerges as an ethical leader, one who is reluctant to place her 
family in further danger but who does so to honour the work of her martyred husband. All the Through the Looking Glass: Muslim Women on Television— 
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same, Dalia is put in her place multiple times, most significantly by Jack, who reminds her of her 
family’s foreign status. Ultimately, while the Hassans may be appealing characters for a Muslim 
audience, particularly in light of the limited alternatives, they are still marginalized. 
A similar silencing occurs on the popular serial Lost (2004-2010), whose characters move 
through the past, present, and a mysterious afterlife. The character of Nadia in this show is 
simultaneously peripheral and consistently significant in the plot. Although she is not one of the 
main characters, she is at the heart of a tragedy that motivates the central character of Sayid in all 
of his actions. Sayid himself attracts racism and unwelcome attention from another character, 
who sees any Iraqi as suspect. These suspicions are proven correct: throughout the series, Sayid 
indicates that he is a dangerous man, one who is willing to sacrifice others to save his lost love 
Nadia. Sayid is initially haunted by the fact that he encountered Nadia in his former existence as 
an Iraqi interrogator, and was on the verge of killing her when she refused to cooperate. Instead, 
he saved her, but is nonetheless tormented repeatedly by scenarios from the past and from the 
afterlife, where he is not capable of giving her the life she deserves. Indeed, rather bizarrely, 
while Sayid is driven to seek out Nadia repeatedly throughout the series, the resolution provided 
to him by the finale is one that reconciles him with another woman, with whom he briefly had an 
affair. 
In every scenario, Nadia is beautiful, exotic and enigmatic, like the mysterious women 
described in Orientalist travelogues. As an Iraqi, she, like Sayid, is automatically tied to 
terrorism, crime, and violence, although she is frequently a victim who rarely has an opportunity 
to act on her own. She is a means to an end, used by the CIA in order to compel Sayid’s 
cooperation in a terrorist plot. Later, Sayid’s brother manipulates him into committing a crime, 
suggesting that it is necessary in order to save Nadia from the threat of violence. Sayid alternates 
between being Nadia’s saviour and the man who lets her down. In either case, she is not so far 
removed from the women in Orientalist tropes: she is defined exclusively in relation to a Muslim 
man, one who is characterized by his physical power relative to her own powerlessness. She is in 
need of salvation, and unlikely to receive it.  
One might argue that something very different occurs in Little Mosque on the Prairie, 
which features Muslim women (and men) in everyday life, rather than incorporating Muslim 
characters in dangerous situations. Indeed, the show serves as a counterpoint to Fleras and 
Kunz’s observation that “[b]oth the news and entertainment media foster disparaging images of 
Muslims as backward or fanatic. Muslim women are portrayed as the antithesis of the 
progressive and liberated Canadian mainstream woman” (2001: 145). Unlike 24 or Lost, Little 
Mosque’s entire reason for existence is the depiction of Muslims. The entire premise of the 
show, whose uniqueness and timeliness garnered international headlines upon its debut in 2007, 
is a kind of fish-out-of-water scenario: a Muslim community lives in a Canadian prairie town and 
constantly baffles the white locals. Here, the ignorance of those who live with the Muslims is the 
source of entertainment, although there are certainly opportunities to laugh at some of the 
Muslim characters as well. While a few of the white townspeople are openly racist, some of the 
Muslim characters are conservative to the point of near-fanaticism. Other characters, however, 
are much more nuanced. Indeed, in Little Mosque, the Muslim characters are rounded people, 
albeit within comedic parameters, and thus the show carries far more promise for a balanced 
depiction of Muslim women than either 24 or Lost.  
Having set up such a premise, though, and serving as the first show in North America to 
offer a cast with so many central Muslim characters, Little Mosque has a considerable task to 
fulfil. It certainly makes great strides in this direction, yet I argue here that even Little Mosque Faiza Hirji  42 
falls short of providing a depiction of the Muslim woman that is complete and balanced. Before 
embarking on an analysis, it should be noted that Little Mosque  walks a different artistic 
tightrope than either 24 or Lost. Those two shows depict some form of reality, however bizarre, 
and attempt to generate dramatic tension. As large-scale Hollywood productions, 24 and Lost 
offer suspenseful, action-packed entertainment populated by well-known actors and attracting 
large audiences. Little Mosque, an innovative product of Canada’s public broadcaster, must mine 
the comedic element from everyday life in the Prairies, a very different task. As Fleras and Kunz 
observe, a “‘playing them for laughs’ angle has the effect of de-politicizing minority 
contributions to society while neutering differences to minimize their political potency” (2001: 
101). In fairness, Little Mosque does not entirely neuter difference, but there is certainly an 
element of de-politicization and glossing over difference.  
In Little Mosque, perhaps even more than in 24, there is a singular vision of the Muslim 
woman, best exemplified through the character of Rayyan. She is bright, independent and 
articulate, and usually prepared to speak on behalf of women’s rights. As a physician, she 
commands a certain amount of respect in town, and she appears to have some standing in the 
Muslim community as well. Undoubtedly, this is a more positive depiction than many others 
available through the media. However, encouraging though this may be, the depiction of Rayyan 
is not accompanied by sufficient displays of diversity to really highlight the broad spectrum of 
Muslim womanhood. Other Muslim women on the show tend to be similar to Rayyan in 
significant ways, and when they are not, their religiosity may be called into question.  
With the exception of a teenage Muslim woman, Layla, and one woman, Sarah, who is a 
convert, devout Muslim women on Little Mosque usually wear a head covering and adhere to 
one interpretation of Islam, as though no other existed. For instance, when Rayyan explains why 
she does not date, this is presented as an activity that no devout Muslim woman would 
participate in, rather than an activity that some Muslims would consider off-limits. Similarly, 
Rayyan’s decision to ask her parents to arrange her marriage is presented as the only appropriate 
option, which is certainly not the case for all Muslim women living in North America. Whenever 
there is some questioning of these norms, it usually comes from non-Muslims or from Rayyan’s 
mother, the convert Sarah. A white woman, Sarah seems to fulfil the role of “inauthentic” 
Muslim. She likes to purchase lottery tickets, despite Rayyan’s admonitions against gambling 
(Season 2, Episode 204), does not cover herself—although her dress is certainly not immodest—
and complains mildly about having to fast during Ramadan. On the one hand, Sarah, as a white 
Canadian who has had to learn about Islam, could be seen as a conduit for broadening the 
understanding of Islam on this show. However, I would argue that this is not the case. Sarah can 
explain Islamic practices but does not appear to support all of them. Instead, Rayyan appears to 
fulfil the role of good, authentic, middle-ground Muslim, alongside her friend and imam, Amaar. 
When Yassir and Sarah act in ways that Rayyan deems inappropriate, either she or Amaar 
indicates that the two are stepping outside of the boundaries of true Islamic practice.  
Obviously there are some narrative benefits to this, outside of the humour that is 
generated by Yassir and Sarah’s attempts to tiptoe around their daughter’s sensibilities. Rayyan’s 
assertiveness, and her centrality to the storyline, means that she is able to explain Islamic 
practices to the townspeople and to those in the audience who may desire clarification. 
Juxtaposed against Sarah and Yassir’s rather lax practices, and the quasi-fanatical, conservative 
Baber, Rayyan is one of the two characters with whom the audience would naturally identify, 
and in this role, she becomes an Islamic spokesperson. Certainly Rayyan’s explanation of 
Islamic tenets is logical and reasonable, and may indeed provide clarity. For instance, in Season Through the Looking Glass: Muslim Women on Television— 
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1, Episode 104, Rayyan and Fatima attempt to explain that Muslim women cannot swim in a co-
ed pool, as this would violate Islamic rules about female modesty before men. Similarly, when 
Rayyan does date (e.g., Season 2, Episode 218), she indicates that Islam requires them to have a 
chaperone present. I would argue, however, that Rayyan’s comments in such episodes are 
grounded in a notion that there is only one Islam to explain, rather than various interpretations. 
This may seem like a minor caveat: after all, at least the show seeks to explain Islam to others. 
Moreover, in comparison to Lost  and  24, which incorporate Muslim women into scenarios 
involving conflict and violence, Little Mosque seems like a benign example of representation. 
Indeed, it may almost be seen as a harbinger of positive intercultural communication, seeking to 
build bridges and understanding after 9/11.  
Yet, given the various misunderstandings circulating within North American media and 
political circles about Islam, exemplified by the wave of anti-mosque sentiment that became 
even more pervasive in the United States during the summer of 2010, I would suggest that the 
show has an obligation to present Islam as a religion that is characterized by extraordinary 
diversity. Instead, the decision to depict the characters’ acts as inspired by Islam, not by their 
own interpretation of Islam, seals off the boundaries of any discursive space and renders other 
interpretations irrelevant. 
The appearance of other women fails to break up this monolithic representation of Islam. 
The character of Fatima, who appears regularly, also covers her head and appears to share many 
of the same beliefs as Rayyan. Layla’s refusal to cover her head, despite Baber’s urging, seems 
to stem more from a desire to fit in at school than to debate the necessity of veiling. Such 
consistency may suggest that Muslim women generally fall into a few stereotypical categories. 
While the show appears to work diligently to address and counter notions of oppressed Muslim 
women, its portrayals do not leave space for the many Muslim women who practise differently 
from the female characters on this show.  
This is not intended as a sweeping criticism of the show, which has undoubtedly made 
strides in offering rounded, entertaining Muslim characters, including a strong and appealing 
female at the core of the series. To a degree, it has expanded the range of discourses available 
around the figure of the Muslim woman. Little Mosque  has helped to change the face of 
television, and in a limited sense, perhaps 24 and Lost have contributed to this as well. Little 
Mosque, in particular, provides some alternatives and much-needed humour when compared to 
news images of oppressed Muslim women. The terrorist characters on 24  certainly did not 
expand the repertoire of discourses available, but to a small extent, the two Nadia characters may 
have done so. Exploding some stereotypes of how Muslim women should look, for instance, the 
characters do not necessarily dress much differently than other North American women: neither 
veils, and neither is connected to terrorism despite a few hints that this possibility is always 
present. 24 and Lost now belong to the past, however, while Little Mosque has, hopefully, more 
seasons to contribute, and undoubtedly, I think, given the educational aspirations expressed by 
creator Zarqa Nawaz and executive producer Mary Darling (cited in McGinn, 2007), it has more 
messages to contribute and bridges to build, not only between Muslim  and non-Muslim 
audiences, but within Muslim communities. As Dakroury (2008) notes, Little Mosque is also 
distinctive because it is produced by the national public broadcaster, which has a mandate to 
reflect the country’s identity and to act, where possible, as a kind of public sphere (also see Eid 
& Khan, 2011, for a related discussion). This being the case, Little Mosque  has a heavier 
responsibility than shows driven strictly by Hollywood economics. Rather than seeking to Faiza Hirji  44 
entertain and attract advertising at any cost, the show must work to depict diversity in a 
responsible way.  
 
Prime Time: Opportunities, Past and Present 
 
Ultimately, Little Mosque’s attempts to educate viewers about Muslims separate it significantly 
from the dramas under discussion, which have no other apparent mandate than to entertain their 
viewers. However, it seems that all of these shows have significant shortcomings in terms of 
their ability to expand the spectrum of existing discourses about Muslim women. Rather than 
truly interrogating what it means to be a Muslim woman, all three shows offer limited or 
monolithic understandings. Without question, positive strides have been made, but a careful 
analysis of 24, Lost, and Little Mosque on the Prairie demonstrates that Muslim women are still 
underrepresented and stereotyped when they do appear on North American television. In the case 
of  24  and  Lost, depicting Muslim women more frequently may have served to reinforce 
misunderstanding about Islam and gender, rather than challenging it. Admittedly, these shows 
aim for entertainment first, education second—if at all. However, the potential outcome is 
significant enough that their approaches must be examined and challenged.  
As Fleras and Kunz observe, misrepresentation of minorities signals more than a single 
injustice or an artistic oversight when “the ‘real’ world is filtered through a prism of prevailing 
messages, symbols, and representations”. They add that misrepresentations of women of colour 
“are not simply a mistake in perception, but rather a system of social control” (2001: 179). In the 
world after 9/11, when citizens make decisions about the building of mosques or the veiling of 
women on the basis of information provided by media, such a system has potentially ruinous 
consequences. Portrayals of Islam as monolithic in its treatment of gender merely reinforce 
stereotypes about lack of diversity in Islam, about gendered interactions and about individual 
rights. For instance, while Dakroury (2008) notes that Little Mosque spans positions ranging 
from liberal to conservative, she does not comment on the fact that the show’s spectrum still 
covers one particular kind of Islam only. For instance, all of Mercy’s Muslims seem to practise 
the same way—if there are Sunnis and Shias, who would differ in their understanding of how an 
imam is appointed, or in the specifics of their prayers, this is not made apparent. Suggestions that 
Muslims are significantly different from the rest of the population, requiring numerous 
accommodations, have some educational value yet they also reinforce the idea that Muslims are 
problematic.  
While television may appear to have been changed superficially by the events of 9/11, 
most references to diversity, Islam and gender continue to be insufficient and some are highly 
negative. At the very least, they represent a missed opportunity to contribute meaningfully to 
public education. At the most, they represent the strengthening of a longstanding negative 
discourse that threatens to persist for many years to come, with its shadow looming over debates 
about veiling, mosques, and immigration. In the wake of 9/11, one would hope that greater 
strides had been made. Instead, the struggle—and the stereotypes—continue. 
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